The Fall of Kabul: Reflections After One Year
It has been a year since the Republic of Afghanistan fell, with the Taliban engulfing the streets of Kabul on August 15, 2021. During the last twenty years of its mission, the United States had spent $2.313 trillion[1] on the Afghanistan war, yet provinces fell like dominoes[2]. The fall of the Republic signified not only the misuse of aid but also that the American presence in the region provided nothing more than a veneer of stability. Inspired by the hopes to free Afghanistan from the iron grip of the Taliban and build a modern democratic state those ideals faced the daunting reality of this region. In this essay the conclusion of this mission at the Hindu Kush for the US endeavors for nation-building will be discussed, presenting a picture of a strategy, which was mostly built on a distorted perception and lack of local awareness.
The success and Failures of Nation Building
For some, the withdrawal debacle could be equated to the end of nation-building[3]. President Biden shared this sentiment, echoing on August 31, 2021: “[t]his decision about Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan. It’s about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries”[4].
These arguments are faced with the rebuttal of Germany and Japan’s state-building after World War 2. RAND’s seminal America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq argues:
“Both [Germany and Japan] were comprehensive efforts that aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction. The success of these endeavors demonstrated that democracy was transferable; that societies could, under certain circumstances, be encouraged to transform themselves; and that major transformations could endure”[5].
It is worth stating that these noted endeavors do not demonstrate that democracy was transferable, but that democracy can be reinstated. Japan and Germany’s post-World War 2 reformations are noteworthy not just because of their success, but also because of the rebuilding of former institutions. In both instances, Japan and Germany had a history of political openness illustrated in the Taisho Democracy and Weimar Republic.
The positive and negative cases of state-building in Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan share one fundamental characteristic: they are exceptional. Efforts to unify Afghanistan under a singular government were tampered with by the state being dominated by local clans with limited centralisation of government, no uniform language, and economic reliance on an illicit narcotics market. Moreover, Afghanistan borders Pakistan, “the main backer of the Taliban and Iran”[6]. On the other hand, Japan and Germany had had previous democratic institutions. Japan had limited border conflicts, and West Germany’s only regional conflict was communist interference from the East. Additionally, Germany and Japan had sustained developed industries, and there was a strong Japanese and Germanic identity that was wielded in constructing their respective civil societies and central governments.
Lessons from the Failures in Afghanistan
The United States’ strategic failure in Afghanistan in large part comes down to misunderstanding the country and region. Baktash Ahadi, “combat interpreter from 2010 to 2012 and former chair of the State Department’s Afghan Familiarization course,” posed:
“The Marines I worked with were shocked… to hear me exchanging favorite Koran verses with my fellow Afghans, mistaking this for extremism rather than shared piety. When talking to Afghan villagers, the Marines would not remove their sunglasses — a clear indication of untrustworthiness in a country that values eye contact. In some cases, they would approach and directly address village women, violating one of rural Afghanistan’s strictest cultural norms… [America] failed to understand Iraqi culture, too, so that now, many Iraqis see Iran as the lesser of two evils. Before that, we failed to understand Vietnam… we must do better”[7].
This description portrays the United States that is not fully taking into consideration the voices of those it is trying to influence. Instead of refocusing efforts and addressing mistakes, the strategy in Afghanistan became almost entirely contingent on increasing human and financial capital[8]. What nation-building of the future needs to avoid is the framework that “more is better” if existing interventions haven’t been well received. Gaining local popular support before intervening to align interests is both more democratic and a prerequisite for the respective project’s success.
Regional, cultural, and institutional understanding are necessary components in the success of democratization, specifically, success in terms of fully involving the public. Who are the regional actors, what are their interests, and how much of a barrier or support will they cause? These actors can be crucial bridges to involving local communities in the political process, and that option, if available, should be utilized. What roles do geography, natural resources, religion, and other established social norms play? One needs to speak the language of the people they’re trying to support; money does not nullify ignorance. What institutions previously existed, and which ones are worthy of keeping? On each of these fronts, the responsibility lies with the imposing state or states. Gaining understanding requires as much cooperation as the state-building process. As asserted by Daron Acemoglu:
“[M]ost states have been constructed not by force but by compromise and cooperation. The successful centralization of power under state institutions more commonly involves the assent and cooperation of the people subject to it. In this model, the state is not imposed on a society against its wishes; rather, state institutions build legitimacy by securing a modicum of popular support”[9].
Afghanistan Today
The Afghanistan of today is a less open society, fomenting instability in the region and the rest of the world. Arguably most prescient are how women’s rights seemingly vanished overnight. Afghan women are barred from attending secondary school, with additional regulations on their dress and ability to move, work, and drive freely. Additionally, music is banned[10] with thousands of artists seeking refuge, and ‘collaborators’ of Western governments and their families have been purged en masse. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan published a report on July 20, 2022, finding that 700 civilians have been killed after the Taliban takeover with 160 extrajudicial killings and 217 instances of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments[11]. On July 31, 2022, the United States assassinated Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. He is believed to be one of many terrorists harbored by the Taliban[12]. Europe, Eurasia, and beyond are at a greater risk of terrorist attacks.
In Afghanistan, key errors in the nation-building process share blame for millions of displaced individuals, countless human rights abuses, and greater potential for future instability and warfare in the region and beyond. Nation-building is a difficult, compromising task, with as much risk as there is reward. While a successful nation-building operation has the potential of dramatically increasing human rights, peace, and stability, a failure risks much the opposite. If a state(s) determines to engage in nation-building, it ought to make sure it has the background, skills, and support necessary to reach its goals. Ultimately, if the people’s image of their society is disconnected from the image of the imposing state(s), this discrepancy needs to be fully accounted for and rectified. Subservience alone does not create a state, much more prescient is dialogue, accountability, and rule by consent.
Bibliography:
[1] “Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022: Figures: Costs of War.” The Costs of War. Accessed August 17, 2022. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022.
[2] Team, The Visual Journalism. “Mapping the Advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan.” BBC News. BBC, August 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57933979.
[3] Nunan, Timothy. “The End of Nation-Building.” NOEMA, August 24, 2021. https://www.noemamag.com/the-end-of-nation-building/.
[4] “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan.” The White House. The United States Government, August 31, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/.
[5] Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina. “America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq.” RAND Corporation, January 1, 2003. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html.
[6] Price, Gareth. “Why Afghan Nation-Building Was Always Destined to Fail.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, September 10, 2021. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/why-afghan-nation-building-was-always-destined-fail.
[7] Ahadi, Baktash. “Opinion | I Was a Combat Interpreter in Afghanistan, Where Cultural Illiteracy Led to U.S. Failure.” The Washington Post. September 1, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/31/afghanistan-combat-interpreter-baktash-ahadi-us-cultural-illiteracy/.
[8] “WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION.” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, August 2021. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf.
[9] Acemoglu, Daron. “Why Nation-Building Failed in Afghanistan.” Project Syndicate, August 31, 2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/afghanistan-top-down-state-building-failed-again-by-daron-acemoglu-2021-08.
[10] Blair, Elizabeth. “Thousands of Afghan Artists Are Still Trying to Flee the Taliban.” NPR. NPR, July 29, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/07/29/1114103100/thousands-of-afghan-artists-are-still-trying-to-flee-the-taliban.
[11] “UN RELEASES REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER.” UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN, July 20, 2022. https://unama.unmissions.org/un-releases-report-human-rights-afghanistan-taliban-takeover.
[12] Smith, Graeme, and Ibraheem Bahiss. “Talk to the Taliban--But Don't Trust Them.” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/talk-taliban-dont-trust-them.
Comments